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RULES
U.R.A.P. 11(e)(2) provides:
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported
by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript
of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant
portions of the transcript.
C.J.A. 4-505:
Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court and set
forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by
the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the
time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and
affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellees agree with Appellant's statement of Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Appellant Christenson lacks standing to challenge the judgment of

the Trial Court where Appellant: 1) did not oppose the entry of summary judgment; 2) is not a
party affected by the challenged portion of the judgment; 3) has no interest in the subject matter
to which a challenge is made; and 4) there is no public policy reason to permit the Appellant to
act on behalf of those potentially affected by the judgment.
Standard of Review. A court, including an appellate court, may address the issue of
standing at any time in proceedings by motion or sua sponte. Sierra Club v. Dept. ofEnv.
Quality, 857 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1993).
2.

Whether the amount of attorneys fees awarded by the Trial Court's amounted to

an abuse of discretion based the evidence before it.
Standard of Review. If there is a sufficient evidentiary basis, the amount and
reasonablness of the fee awarded is left to the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be
disturbed absent abuse of that discretion. Foote v. Clark 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1998).
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RULES RELEVANT FOR REVIEW
CJ.A. Rule 4-505 provides in relevant part:
Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court
and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work
performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to
judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which
attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for
comparable legal services.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE.
This case arises out of a foreclosure proceeding commenced by Plaintiff/Appellant
Richard Christenson ("Christenson") against numerous potential interest holders of certain real
property in Salt Lake County, including the Defendants/Appellees, the Michels ("Michels").
After nearly four years of prosecuting the litigation, Christenson conceded that he held no
interest in the property and that Michels were entitled to summary judgment against Christenson.
See R. 1216. Judgment was entered accordingly. Id.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
On March 29, 1996, Christenson began foreclosure proceedings against certain real
property in Salt Lake County, (the "Property"). Christenson's foreclosure action sought to
foreclose a 1978 lien Christenson claimed against the Property.
The Michels asserted a superior ownership interest in the Property, as successors in
interest to Zions Bank, owners of the Property through a Trustee's Deed acquired in 1993. See R.
179-183. Christensen sued the Michels and dozens of other defendants with a potential record
interest in the Property.
6

Throughout the four year course of the litigation, pleadings were amended, over a dozen
depositions were conducted, numerous expert witnesses were retained, discovery was exchanged.
There are over 1200 pages of documents in the Trial Court record alone. The Court of Appeals
decision in the related case ofZions First National Bank v. Richard McKean, et, al, 200 UT App
76, held that Christenson's 1978 lien interest had been terminated by foreclosure proceeding in
1983 by Zion's Bank. See R. 1139-1144. Based on the ruling that Christenson's interest was
foreclosed in 1983, Christenson conceded that Michels were entitled to summary judgment in
this matter. See R. 1216. Christenson now appeals the form of the order which holds that the
Michels are the owners of the Property as against all others and for the amount of attorneys fees
awarded to the Michels by the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Christenson does not appeal the factual basis for the court's decision granting
Appellees Michels Summary Judgment or Michels' entitlement to attorneys fees. On appeal,
Christenson only disputes the breadth of the final order and the evidentiary basis of the amount
of attorney's fees awarded.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In this matter, Christenson has no standing to attack the portion of the judgment which
adjudicates the potential interests of unrelated third parties whom Christenson had originally
named as defendants in the case. Further, Christenson fails to marshal the evidence present in
the trial court to demonstrate that not all of the named defendants were served and so should not
be bound by the Trial Court's ruling.

7

The Michels were awarded their attorneys fees by Judge Young. Christenson does not
challenge Michel's entitlement to attorneys fees. Instead, on appeal Christenson challenges the
evidentiary support for the amount of the award and its reasonableness. Again, Christenson fails
to marshal the evidence supporting the award and demonstrate why the evidence presented was
insufficient to support the award. The facts show that evidence of the amount of fees and their
reasonableness were considered by Judge Young whose judgment should not be disturbed on
appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.
STANDING
A.

APPELLANT CHRISTENSON LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON BEHALF OF OTHERS.
On appeal, Christenson argues that the Trial Court's Order is overly-broad because it

potentially binds parties over whom the Trial Court had no jurisdiction. Although it is axiomatic
that judgments are presumed valid, the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
When a Judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered
by a court of general jurisdiction, the law presumes that
jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party attacking
jurisdiction to prove its absence.

State Dept. of Social Services v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1133 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). The
judgment in this matter provides in relevant part:
Defendants Michelsy Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Accordingly,
neither the Plaintiff nor any of the Defendants in this action other than the four
Michel Defendants, have any right, title or interest in and to the real property
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which is the subject of this action. Such real property is further described on the
attached Exhibit "A".
R. 1216.
First, it should be remembered that Appellant Christenson conceded that he had no
interest in the Property based on the ruling of the Court of Appeals in the companion case which
terminated his interest as a matter of law. See R. 179-183. The Trial Court's Order echoes that
admission. R. 1216.
Now, for some reason, Appellant Christenson now chooses argue on behalf of the other
defendants that the Order is too broad because it may bar the interests of some defendants or
unknown third parties. It seems rather ironic that Christenson now seeks to protect the potential
interests of the very people whom he sought to deprive of any interest in the Property by the
foreclosure proceedings he started. Christenson has absolutely no legal interest in the property.
Christenson has conceded that fact stipulated to the entry of summary judgment. R. 1216.
In order to have standing in Utah a person must show three things:
First, a litigant must show that he has suffered some distinct and palpable
injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute.
Second, the litigant may have standing if no one else has a greater interest
in the outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be raised
otherwise. Even if he is unable to meet the first two tests, under the third
test, a litigant may nonetheless have standing if the issues are unique and
of such great public importance that they ought to be decided in the
furtherance of the public interest.
Blodgett v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Terracor v. Utah
Bd. Of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1983)).

Appellant Christenson fails to satisfy any of the requirements necessary to gain standing
to challenge the Order of the Trial Court. Appellant has no stake in the outcome of the judgment
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as it relates to any third parties. Appellant further conceded that he had no interest in the
Property in the Trial Court. See R. 1916. The interests of those claiming to have an interest in the
Property have, if they desire, the right to challenge the judgment themselves. See e.g. Vigil, at
1133. If the judgment was rendered against their interests without jurisdiction, the Trial Court
may then act to address the issue. However, it is not for Appellant to assert those claims on
behalf of others. Finally, there is no public interest aspect to this private, civil dispute. In sum,
Appellant Christenson fails to show standing under any of the three available methods set forth
under Utah law and the case should be affirmed for Christenson's lack of standing to challenge
the entry of Summary Judgment as such judgment relates to others.
B.

APPELLANT CHRISTENSON FAILS TO MARSHAL ANY EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT HIS CLAIMS.
Appellant Christenson fails to marshal any evidence from the record to support his claims

that not all interested parties were served in this matter. Aside from the fact that Appellant has
no standing to challenge the judgment on behalf of others, he fails to marshal the evidence in the
record to support his claims. It is Appellant's burden on appeal to place all of the evidence
regarding service of the defendants before this Court and then to demonstrate its inadequacy. It
is not for the Appellee to demonstrate, by citing to the record or otherwise, that all defendants
were served personally or by publication. The burden to show it didn't happen rests with the
Plaintiff/Appellant. Appellant Christensen utter failure to address the record on appeal or marshal
the evidence regarding which parties were or were not served is fatal to his claims on appeal.
Notwithstanding the foregoing facts, a detailed review of the record discloses that the
Appellant in incorrect in his assertion that the other defendants were not properly served. Many
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of the defendants were served individually. The remainder were served by publication following
appellants motion and subsequent Court order permitting such service.
II.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
A.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS PROPER AND
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
Christenson does not argue on appeal that the Michels are not entitled to an award of

attorneys fees. Appellant challenges the adequacy of the evidence supporting amount of the fees
awarded. Rule 4-505 states:
Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court and
set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by
the attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time
spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm
the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services.

C.J.A. 4-505.
Typically where there is an appeal of an award of attorneys fees, the court examines the
award for correctness. Foote v. Clark,962, P. 2d 53 (Utah 1998). However, the Appellees' right
to recover attorneys fees in this matter is not disputed by Appellant Christenson and should not
be subject to this Court's appellate review. Instead, Appellant appeals only on the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the amount of the award. In such a case, when the court can determine
the evidentiary basis for the award is adequate, the award will be upheld. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald
961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998).
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In his effort to persuade this Court that counsel's affidavit was insufficient, Appellant's
counsel resorts to flat misrepresentation of the contents of counsel's affidavit. Appellant
represents to this Court that Michels' counsel's "affidavit makes it apparent that the charges
include sums for attorney's fees for work done on cases other than the case before Judge Young."
See Brief of Appellant, P.8. This assertion is plainly contrary to the averment of Michels'
counsel contained on paragraph 8 of his affidavit. Counsel stated:
The foregoing fees are related to this case only. Additional fees have been expended in
the related cases of (a) Zions First National Bank v. Richard McKean, et, al (handled by
Judge Frederick) and TWN v. Michel, (pending in Provo). None of time for such cases
has been included in this Affidavit.
R. 1196-1197.

This exact same argument was raised and rejected by the Trial Court. See, R. 1190.
That the Trial Court chose to believe counsel's representation over Christenson's baseless
assertion is obvious.
Christenson next argues that the amount of the fees must be excessive because they
exceeded the fees Christenson expended in the same proceeding. In Foote, the court held that the
amount of the damages recovered does not make the attorneys fees unreasonable "just because it
is greater than the amount recovered under the contract." Foote, at 56. Similarly, the amount of
fees that one party expends defending a matter is not unreasonable just because the opposing
party spends less on the matter. The affidavit was sufficient under C.J.A. Rule 4-505 because it
identified the attorneys who worked on the file, detailed the types of activities in which the
parties were engaged for over four years, such as responding to the Complaint and the Amended
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Complaint, conducting depositions, discovery, research, motions, hearings, etc. See R. 11951201. The record before the Trial Court comprises 1200 pages of documents and pleadings
which does not include any of the deposition transcripts or the voluminous discovery exchanged.
Christenson's counsel also attacks the hourly rate of $160.00. The rate is supported by
the affidavit of counsel and his 23 years of experience as a litigator in Salt Lake County. The
hourly rate was not challenged with any evidence to the contrary in the court below. The bare
conclusions forward by Christenson that the hourly rate is excessive fail to demonstrate that the
hourly rate was unreasonable.
B.

APPELLANT CHRISTENSON FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE THAT
THE FINDINGS WERE INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS FEES.
Appellant Christenson asserts that the findings were inadequate to support the attorney's

fees awarded by the Trial Court. Appellant has chosen not to provide a transcript of the Trial
Court's hearing on the matter. Appellant cannot fail to order the transcript of the proceedings in
which the findings were made and then claim the record is insufficient to support the award.
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by
or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all
evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is
obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the
transcript.
U.R.A.P. 11(e)(2).
In the Court's June 2,2000 Minute Entry the Judge stated, "The Court grants the motion for
summary judgment and awards attorneys fees. Mr. Nelson is to prepare an affidavit and order for
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the Court." R. 1189. The tape number and tape count of the hearing was set forth in the Trial
Court's Minute Entry. See R. 1189. In it's last Minute Entry, the Court stated:
On June 2, 2000, the Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
awarded attorney's fees. Mr. Nelson prepared an affidavit and Order for the Court
consistent with the Court's findings.
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file approves and signs the Defendants
Order for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Order Granting Attorney's Fees

R. 1207 (emphases added).
Appellant bears the initial burden of marshaling all the evidence to show that despite the
evidence presented to the Trial Court, the findings were insufficient to base the award of
attorney's fees. In some cases the burden of marshaling the evidence is excused where the record
is incomplete. See Anderson v. Doms, UT App. 207, ^| 9-10. However, the Appellant cannot be
the cause of the incomplete record. In this matter, Appellant Christenson invites the very error
he attempts assign on appeal. Christenson failed to order a transcript of the findings referenced
in the June 2, 2000 Minute Entry. See R. 1224. Appellant's own failure to request a transcript
cannot provide him the platform upon which to stand to argue the Court's findings are
incomplete. Appellant's failure to marshal the evidence in the record which was available
violates the purposes of U.R.A.P. 11(e)(2). As a result, Christenson fails to carry his burden on
appeal to demonstrate that the award of fees was based on inadequate findings, insufficient
evidentiary foundation or amounted to an abuse of discretion.
The Court can uphold a fee determination when the underlying evidence is sufficient to
support such an award without an entry of findings by the Court. See Valcarce, at 319. In this
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matter there was only one party with a claim against the Appellees Michels. The Michels
defended the matter for four years and expended considerable sums in doing so. The detailed
nature of the charges was expressed in the affidavit of counsel, there was no counter-affidavit or
any evidence submitted to suggest that time billed to Appellees Michels was expended in other
pursuits or on unrelated claims, parties or issues. This contrasts the fee separation requirements
imposed on parties in multi-party or multiple claim litigation as required by Foote. Appellant's
failure to properly place the record before the Court and marshal the evidence are fatal to his
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Christenson's appeal must fail because he has no standing to contest how the Trial
Court's Order may affect third parties. Christenson also fails to demonstrate that the trial court
abused its discretion in the amount of attorneys fees awarded where the evidentiary basis for the
award was adequate on the record and when he failed to marhsal the evidence necessary to
challenge the award on appeal. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J_

day of March, 2001

NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN

By:
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ice J. Nelson, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellees,
Michels

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this

.

day of March, 2001,1 caused to be mailed, postage

prepaid, the required number of true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellees' Brief to the
following:
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
NELSON SNUFFER & DAHLE, P.C.
Attorney for Richard A. Christenson
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
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FILED
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
Zions First National Bank, a
national association,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Richard A. Christensen;
Richard F. McKeen and Maurine
G. McKeen, his wife; New
Empire Development Company;
Backman Abstract and Title;
Capitol Thrift and Loan;
Franklin Financial; Traverse
Kills Associates; Valley Bank
& Trust Company; Myron B.
Child, Jr. dba Child &
Associates; State Tax
Commission; and Martha W.
Snyder,

Case No. 981733-CA
F I L E D
(March 1 6 , 2 0 0 0 )
2000 UT App 761

Defendants and Appellant,
Uwe Michel, Annette Michel,
Ullrich Michel, and Corolla
Michel,
Intervenors.

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Sandy, for Appellant
Bruce J. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Davis.
DAVIS, Judge:
Defendant Richard A. Christensen appeals the trial court]s
denial of his Renewed Motion to Vacate Judgment. Defendant first

argues nhat the 1982 judgment rust oe vacated for lack of in
personam jurisdiction
"'A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment
under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed only
for an abuse of discretion
However, wnen a
motion to vacate a judgment is based on a
claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district
court has no discretion
if jurisdiction is
lacking, the judgment: cannot stand without
denying due process to the one against whom
it runs
Therefore, the propriety of the
jurisdictional determination, and hence the
decision not to vacate, becomes a question of
law upon which we oo not defer to the
district court '"
Classic Cabinets, Inc v All ^m life Ins
*|9, 978 P 2d 465 (citations omitted)

Co , 1999 UT App 88,

Defendant has the burden to snow tnat the trial court lacked
the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate defendant's rights
"'When a judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered
by a court of general jurisdiction, the law presumes that
jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party attacking
jurisdiction to prove its absence '" Bonneville Billing v
Whatley, 949 P 2d 768, 775 n 7 (Utah Ct App 1997) (alteration
and citation omitted), accord State v Viiil, 784 P 2d 1130, 1133
(Utah 1989), see also Skanchv v Calcacos Ortope SA, 952 P 2d
1071, 1074-75 (Utah 1998) ("[Defendant] had the burden of showing
that the service was invalid " ) , Reed v Reed. 806 P 2d 1182,
1185 (Utah 1991) (" [T]he burden was upon defendant to prove that
service was improper ")
"This presumption is based at least
partially on necessity " Villi, 784 P 2d at 1133
The presumption is that judgments of superior
courts of general jurisdiction are regularly
rendered even though the record does not
disclose that the court acquired jurisdiction
and the fact that there was no allegation or
finding as to a jurisdictional requirement is
not grounds for setting aside the judgment
after the expiration of the time for appeal
The distinction to be made is between a
record on the face of which lack of
jurisdiction is apparent and one which is
silent or incomplete as to some
jurisdictional fact
In the latter instance
the mere absence from the record of necessary
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jurisdictional facts will not overcome the
presumption of jurisdiction.
Coshatt v. Calmac Mfa. Corp., 602 P.2d 845, 846 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1979) (emphasis added).
" [T]he invalidity or absence of service of process can be
shown by clear and convincing evidence." Carnes v. Carnes, 668
P.2d 555, 557 (Utah 1983); see also Classic Cabinets, 1999 UT App
88 at Kl3. The only "evidence" defendant has provided is the
lack of a return of service in the original trial court's file.
Noticeably absent is a sworn affidavit by defendant denying that
he was served. See Carnes, 668 P.2d at 557 (holding defendant's
affidavit denying that he was served with process was sufficient
to preclude trial court's grant of summary judgment); Classic
Cabinets, 1999 UT App 88 an Hl3 (holding affidavit providing that
company had no "record of receiving" service of process was not
clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut constable's
Affidavit of Service); but see Casida v. Deland. 866 P.2d 599,
602 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("While the judge 'should not
arbitrarily reject competent, credible, uncontradicted testimony,
nevertheless he [or she] is not compelled to believe evidence
where there is anything about it which would reasonably justify
refusal to accept it as the facts, and this includes the selfinterest of the witness.'") (citation omitted). To overcome his
burden, defendant was required to provide competent evidence
showing that service of process was not completed or was
improper. See Skanchy, 952 P.2d at 1075 (holding defendants'
argument regarding invalid service failed because defendants
offered no supporting evidence); Reed, 806 P.2d at 1185 (stating
it was defendant's burden to provide evidence that service was
improper); cf. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge [and] shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence . . . . " ) ;
Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112, 1126 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) ("It takes only one competent sworn statement to . . .
create an issue of fact."). Because defendant has only generally
argued through counsel, as opposed to providing sworn testimony,
that he was never served, he has failed to meet his burden of
proof that the 1982 judgment was entered without the requisite in
personam jurisdiction. 1
Defendant argues next that "[t]he failure to give notice of
the summary judgment motion deprived Richard A. Christensen of
due process." However, defendant fails to develop this argument
1. During his sworn deposition, when asked whether he knew if he
was served in the earlier action, defendant candidly admitted,

"No, I don't."

981733-CA
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and merely reargues his position that the lack of any record
evidence regarding service of process supports his contention
that he was never served. Accordingly, we do not address this
argument further. See Salt Lake City v. Wood, 19 99 UT App 3 23,
f5, 991 P.2d 595 (opinion of Bench, J.) (stating this court will
not address "cursorily presented issues" "unaccompanied by
argument, analysis, or citation to any authority").
Lastly, defendant argues that the 1982 judgment should be
vacated because his surname is misspelled on the caption of the
pleadings. Defendant maintains that the misspelling by the one
letter creates an ambiguity regarding who the judgment affects:
Richard A. Christensen, or Richard A. Christenson. While we
agree that "accuracy is always to be desired[,] . . . there
should be no penalty or adverse effect for mere error which
causes no harm." Downev State Bank v. Maior-Blakenev Corp., 545
P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1976).
Defendant claims he is prejudiced in the amount of
$1,850,000. However, his "prejudice" arises from the existence
of the judgment, not from the misspelling of one letter in his
last name. Defendant does not claim that because of the
misspelling, he was not put on notice that the "Richard A.
Christensen" in the caption referred to him. See Sulzen v.
Williams, 1999 UT App 76, 1115, 977 P. 2d 497 (holding that
amendment of caption in complaint was appropriate because,
although defendants were incorrectly named, they "were
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings").
Furthermore, if defendant was not: the same person named in
the caption, except for the incorrect letter, he would be without
the necessary standing to challenge the lack of service of
process and the trial court's resulting lack of in personam
jurisdiction. Cf^_ Overturf v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 1999
UT 3, 1)5, 973 P. 2d 413 (""Persons who are not parties of record
to a suit have no standing therein which will enable them to take
part in . . . the proceedings.'") (citation omitted; alteration
in original).
Finally, defendant fails to cite any authority for the
proposition that a judgment must be vacated when a defendant's
name is misspelled by one letter. Thus, defendant's failure to
comply with Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) (9) provides an
additional basis to reject his argument.
In sum, because defendant has failed to meet his burden of
showing that he was never served with process, and judgments are
presumed to be entered with the requisite jurisdiction, we affirm
the trial court's denial of defendant's Renewed Motion to Vacate
Judgment. We also deny defendant's request to vacate the 1982

Qfll 71^-CA
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judgment on the basis that his name was incorrectly spelled in
the caption.2

W^^
James' Z\

Davis ,/^udge

/

WE CONCUR:

lX-^2^±±

'CAM^fC*

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

Norman H. Jacksg£f,
Associate Presiding Judge

2. Based on our disposition of the issues, we do not address
interveners' arguments regarding the timeliness of defendant's
motions and the prejudice to intervenors if the 1982 judgment is
vacated.

981733-CA
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of March, 2000, a true and
correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was deposited in
the United States mail to:
DENVER C. SNUFFER JR.
NELSON SNUFFER & DAHLE
10885 S STATE ST
SANDY UT 84070-4104
BRUCE J. NELSON
NELSON RASMUSSEN L CKRISTSNSEN
215 S STATE STE 900
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8 4111
and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION
v/as deposited in the United States mail to the judge listed
below:
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 18 60
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860

hk

Chl&Jsxl /}

(JOjdlciaf S e c r e t a r y

/f"^

TRIAL COURT: THIRD DISTRICT,
APPEALS CASE N O . : 9 8 1 7 3 3 - C A

SALT LAKE,

C-81-6354

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD A CHRISTENSON,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
INCOURT NOTE

vs.

Case No: 960902187 PR

UWE MICHEL

Clerk:

Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DAVID S. YOUNG
June 2, 2 000

careyss

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DENVER C SNUFFER
Defendant's Attorney(s): BRUCE J. NELSON
Video
Tape Number:
2000-29
Tape Count: 10:11-10:27

The court grants the motion for summary judgment, and awards
attorneys fees. Mr. Nelson is to prepare an affidavit and order
for the court.

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. #3032
Attorney for Plaintiff
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSON
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400

Third Judlcsal District
JUL i - 2000

IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON,
Plaintiff,

;
)
;)

OPPOSITION TO ATTORNEY
FEE APPLICATION

VS.

UWE MICHEL and ULLRICH MICHEL
as joint tenants; et al.,
Defendants.

)
]
)
]

Civil No. 960902187
Judge David S. Young

Plaintiff objects to the application for attorney's fee for the following reasons:
1. The Affidavit and supporting materials do not provide enough information to allow any
analysis by the Plaintiff or the Court as to the reasonableness of the amounts claimed. The affidavit
is. therefore, insufficient and should not be a basis for an award. The affidavit does not meet the
requirements for admission of evidence, and has an insufficient foundation, lacking specificity and
lacking supporting materials.
2. The Affidavit makes it apparent that the charges include sums for attorneys fees for work
done on cases other than the case before Judge Young. This includes the case before Judge
Frederick as well and the Court of Appeals. There was never any intention by the Court to make an
award of attorneys for those other legal proceedings in this case, nor would it be appropriate to do

so.
3. Given the nature, complexity and overall case before Judge Young, the amount claimed
of in excess of $38,000.00 is not reasonable. The total charges dramatically exceed the amounts
incurred by Plaintiffs in this same proceeding. Accordingly, the amounts are excessive. The fee is
not reasonable and should be reduced by the Court.
4. The amount charged of $160.00 per hour is not reasonable and should be reduced by the
Court.
Further objections are not possible without supporting materials provided by Defendant's
Counsel.

DATED this

\i
l^

day of July, 2000.

Denver C. Jm-uffer, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING:

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Nelson, Snuffer and Dahle, P.C. and that I caused
to either be placed in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to the following:

Bruce J. Nelson
Attorney for Uwe Michel & Ullrich Michel
Nelson, Rasmussen & Christensen
576 South State Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Dated this J-. day of July, 2000.

'# UC

FILED DISTRICT COUBT
Third Judicial District

Bruce J. Nelson (2380)
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN, P.C
576 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Attorneys for Defendants Michel

JUL 19 2000
LT LAKE COUNTY

By
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE J. NELSON
REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES

vs.
UWE MICHEL, et al.

Civil No. 960902187
Defendants.

Judge David S. Young

Bruce J. Nelson, after being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and states:
1.

Affiant is attorney for Defendants Michel and has acted in such capacity throughout

the course of this litigation. Plaintiff Richard A. Christenson's Complaint was filed in March of
1996. Accordingly, Affiant has represented Defendants Michel in this matter for over four (4) years.
2.

In his capacity as counsel for Defendants Michel, Affiant has conducted multiple

client conferences, interviewed and coordinated the actions of expert witnesses, filed Answers to the
original Complaint and Amended Complaint, responded to multiple discovery requests, participated
in numerous depositions, filed multiple Motions For Summary Judgment, attended multiple court
hearings, conducted settlement negotiations, performed legal research, and in all events has
1

attempted adequately defend the allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint and Amended Complaint.
3.

Affiant has practiced law in Salt Lake County for the past 23 years. Affiant charges

the sum of $160.00 per hour for his legal services and has charged such rates for the past four (4)
years.
4.

In this case, and to defend the allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint and Amended

Complaint, Affiant has expended 244.40 hours of attorney time. At the Affiant's regular hourly
rates, such amount, through the date of this Affidavit, equal $38,773.50. Affiant has billed
Defendants Michel for such amounts and the same have been paid. A month-to-month summary of
Affiant's bills is attached as Exhibit UA".
5.

In addition to the attorney's fees, Affiant has incurred on behalf of Defendants

Michel, substantial costs of Court. These costs of Court equal $3,557.75. A summary of Affiant's
costs is attached as Exhibit "B".
6.

It is Affiant's opinion that the sum of $38,773.50 for attorney's fees and $3,557.75

for costs incurred were all necessary and proper expenses in defending the allegations of Plaintiff s
Complaint and Amended Complaint.
7.

It is the opinion of Affiant that such amounts are fair and reasonable under the

circumstances and in considering the time expended, the complexity of the issues, and the results
obtained.
8.

The foregoing fees are related to this case only. Additional fees have been expended

in the related cases of (a) Zion's First National Bank v. Richard F. McKeen. et al. (handled by Judge

2

Frederick) and TWN v. Michel (pending in Provo). None of the time for such cases has been
included in this Affidavit.
DATED this

(p day of Jt»3, 2000.
/

STATE OF UTAH

/

)
)ss
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

On this Lr day of July, 2000, personally appeared before me BRUCE J. NELSON, the
signer of the foregoing AFFIDAVITOFBRUCE J NELSON REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES,
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
NOTARY PUBLIC
C H A P i r ^ H COLEMAN
767 P <>
nnse Pk Dr
Sannv I T 84093
MvC ^ ™^sion Expires
np 16,2003
STATE OF UTAH

NOTARY PUBLIC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of July. 2000, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
AFFIDA VIT OF BR UCE J. NELSON REGARDING A TTORNEY'S FEES was mailed, postage prepaid to the following:

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Esq.
Nelson Snuffer Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070

Bruce J. Nelson
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FEE SCHEDULE
MICHEL v. CHRISTENSON
Case No. 960902187
EXHIBIT "A"

1 BILL DATED

HOURS

TOTAL $ AMOUNT

1 01-31-97

4.2

$672.00

J 02-28-97*

3.0

$150.00

03-31-97

4.5

$720.00

1 04-30-97

.8

$1,280.00

1 05-31-97

1.5

$240.00

1 06-30-97

—

$0.00

1 07-31-97

.7

$112.00

1 08-31-97

—

$0.00

1 09-30-97

8.9

$1,424.00

1 10-31-97

10.4

$1,664.00

J 11-30-97

9.1

$1,456.00

1 12-31-97

4.4

$704.00

01-31-98

2.3

$368.00 J

02-28-98

4.8

$768.00 J

03-31-98

13.6

$2,175.50 1

04-30-98

53.4

$8,544.00 1

05-31-98

36.9

$5,904.00 1

06-30-98

12.4

$1,984.00 1
1

FEE SCHEDULE
MICHEL v. CHRISTENSON
Case No. 960902187

EXHIBIT "A"

BILL DATED

HOURS

TOTAL $ AMOUNT |

| 07-31-98

26.1

$4,176.00 J

1 08-31-98

21.0

$3,360.00 1

1 09-30-98

4.2

$672.00

1 10-31-98

3.3

$528.00

1 11-31-98

—

$0.00

| 12-31-98

—

$0.00

1 01-31-99

—

$0.00

1 02-28-99

—

$0.00

03-31-99

—

$0.00

04-30-99

—

$0.00

05-31-99

—

$0.00

(06-30-99

—

$0.00

07-31-99

—

$0.00

08-31-99

—

$0.00

J 09-30-99

—

$0.00

[10-31-99

—

$0.00

11-31-99

—

$0.00

12-31-99

—

$0.00
2

FEE SCHEDULE
MICHEL v. CHRISTENSON
Case No. 960902187

EXHIBIT "A"

HOURS

TOTAL $ AMOUNT

01-31-00

—

$0.00

02-29-00

—

$0.00 |

03-31-00

5.0

$800.00

04-30-00

7.2

$1,152.00

05-31-00

3.7

$592.00

06-30-00

3.0

480.00

BILL DATED

24440

TOTAL:

* Billed At $50.00/1tfr.

3

I38J7150

COSTS SCHEDULE
MICHEL v. CHRISTENSON
Case No. 960902187

EXHIBIT "B"
BILL DATED

DESCRIPTION

02-28-97

Copies For Miscellaneous Corporate Filings
Shaun Michel Deposition

03-31-97

Richard Christenson Deposition

$224.00

10-31-97

Richard Christenson Deposition
Mike Kirby Deposition

$234.50
$106.75

04-30-98

Expert Witness Fees (Mike Kirby)
Ralph Marsh Deposition Witness fees
Tully, Webber and Jensen Depositions
Ackerlow and Beck Depositions

$500.00
$25.00
$702.25
$219.90

06-30-98

Walker and Hanks Depositions

$472.40

07-31-98

2nd Christenson Deposition

$257.45

08-31-98

Robinson Deposition
Ralph Marsh Deposition
Expert Witness Fee (Bush & Gudgell)

$324.40
$153.10
$250.00

TOTAL $ AMOUNT |

TOTAL:

1

$52.50
$35.50

$3.557.75

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD A CHRISTENSON,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORDER

vs.

Case No: 960902187 PR

UWE MICHEL

Clerk:

Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DAVID S. YOUNG
August 2, 2 000

chriswc

HEARING
This matter comes now before the Court on Defendant's Notice to
Submit regarding Defendant's Order for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff's Objections to the Order, Defendant's Order Granting
Attorney's Fees, and Plaintiff's Objections to Attorney's Fees.
On June 2, 2000, the Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and awarded attorney's fees. Mr. Nelson prepared an
affidavit and an Order for the Court consistent with the Court's
findings.
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file approves and signs
Defendant's Order for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Order
Granting Attorney's Fees.
Dated this

5'-

day of

„(,<

i-

-•> <. - > < ;

20 -

DAVID
__
District Court Judge

Case No: 960902187
Date:
Aug 02, 2 000
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 960902187 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this J)-

day of C^y^,^

NAME
BRUCE J. NELSON
ATTORNEY DEF
576 East South Temple
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102
DENVER C SNUFFER
ATTORNEY PLA
10885 SOUTH STATE STREET
SANDY, UT 840700000
, 2o2f<2 .

&rtt<r}&/

eputy Court Clerk

Bruce J. Nelson (2380)
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN, P.C.
576 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
„ ^ -1 Q T R Y
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
ENTERED^N F«£-;£.' " T 3y
Attorneys for Defendants Michel
^'

FIIEB

swssasr
°»PWyCfeifr

DATE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IMAGE0

RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS
MICHELS' MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES

UWE MICHEL, et al.
Civil No. 960902187
Defendants.
Judge David S. Young

Defendants Michels' Motion For Attorney's Fees came on for hearing before the aboveentitled court on Friday, June 2, 2000. Bruce J. Nelson, Esq., appeared as counsel for Defendants
Michel, the moving parties. Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Esq., was present and represented the interests
of the Plaintiff Richard A. Christenson. The Court having considered the pleadings and documents
on file herein, the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That Defendants Michel are awarded a Judgment against the Plaintiff for attorney' s

fees incurred in this matter, in the amount of $3 8,773.50. In addition, Defendants Michel are granted
a Judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount of $3,557.75 for costs of Court incurred herein.
• Defendants Michels* Motio

2.

The total Judgment is, therefore, the sum of $42,331.25. Such Judgment shall bear

interest at the legal rate from and after the date p£entry of Judgment.
DATED this

4- day o£My, 2000.
BY THE COURT

^•#^7^

DAVID S. YOUtyG
District Court Jud

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of July, 2000, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MICHELS' MOTIONFOR ATTORNEY'S FEESwas mailed,
postage pre-paid to the following:

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Esq.
Nelson Snuffer Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84Q70

)

Bruce J. Nelson

2

S^

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., #3032
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C
Attorney for Plaintiff
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD CHRISTENSON,
CERTIFICATE THAT NO
TRANSCRIPT IS NECESSARY

Plaintiff,
vs.

UWE MICHEL et al,

Trial Civil No. 960902187
Appellate No. 20000781

Defendants.
Judge David S. Young
Pursuant to Rule 11 (e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant, Richard
Christenson, by and through his attorney of record, Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., hereby certifies to the
Court that no transcript is needed in this action.
DATED this \ ^

day of September, 2000.

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN

Denverr C. Snuffef,
Snufief, Jr:
"Attorney-fef "Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that am employed by Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, and that I served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing CERTIFICATE THAT NO TRANSCRIPT IS NECESSARY,
via first class mail, postage prepaid, on the following:
Bruce J. Nelson
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
576 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
on this(£-h day of September, 2000.
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